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Abstract
Empirical studies such as Goyal, van der Leij and Moraga (2006) or Newman (2004) show that
scientic collaboration networks present a highly unequal and hierarchical distribution of links.
This implies that some researchers can be much more active and productive than others and,
consequently, they can enjoy a much better scientic reputation. One may think that big intrinsical
dierences among researchers can constitute the main driving force behind these huge inequalities.
We propose a model that show how almost identical individuals self-organize themselves in a very
unequal and hierarchical structure as is observed in the real-world co-authorship networks. In
consequence, this model provides an incentives-based explanation of that empirical evidence.
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11 Introduction
Social networks underlie many economic and social activities to the point that certain outcomes cannot
be understood without taking into account the specic network structure. Examples and references
are numerous1. One of the environments in which the key role of a social network is more evident is
academics. In scientic production, the association with a group of competent colleagues to exchange
information is a strong advantage in order to discover errors, raise research questions, and discern the
appropriate ways to solve a problem. This unquestionable signicance of networks in understanding
scientic activity is one of the reasons that explain the extensive empirical work on this eld. Today, in
the advent of the information and communication revolution, data on scientic articles and researchers
is stored in electronic databases containing thousands of records. With the use of these databases,
empirical studies are able to reproduce co-authorship networks (in these networks a link between two
researchers exists whenever there exists an article coauthored by them). From there, they are able to
represent and analyze the main statistics of the collaboration among researchers.
Empirical research about co-authorship networks is large2. Newman (2004), Newman (2001a) and
Newman (2001b) analyze the dening statistics of co-authorship networks in Biology, Physics and Math-
ematics. Laband and Tollison (2000) focus on the importance of informal collaboration relationships in
the comparison between networks in Economics and Biology. Hudson (1996) studies the reasons of the
increase in the number of coauthors per paper in Economics. But the empirical work that most clearly
shows these patterns of collaboration is Goyal, van der Leij and Moraga (2006) (GVM hereafter). This
work describes a detailed image of the features of actual co-authorship networks3.
In spite of the great variety of empirical studies, there is a lack of foundational theoretical models
that analyze how individual decisions contribute to the formation of scientic collaboration networks.
To the best of our knowledge, chapter 4 in van der Leij (2006) is the only attempt to compensate this
deciency. This paper, proposes a model that diers from van der Leij (2006) but shares the same
objective.
1Calv o-Armengol and Jackson (2004) on learning about job openings through contacts or Kranton and Minehart (2001)
on buyer-seller networks are only two examples.
2Albert and Barab asi (2002) oers a survey of empirical studies about any type of networks.
3Although this empirical work refers to the eld of Economics, we will argue that the main characteristics of co-
authorship networks apply to other elds.
21.1 Characteristics of co-authorship networks
Before introducing the model, let us describe some of the key features of scientic collaboration networks.
A surprising characteristic is the small average distance (measured by the shortest path length) between
pairs of nodes. This stylized fact of social networks is captured in the famous "six degrees of separation"
of John Guare's play4. Scientic collaboration networks are not an exception to this phenomenon as
GVM shows. The average distance in the Economics co-authorship network they analyzed was 9.47 with
a total population of 33,027 nodes (i.e. researchers). This regularity extends to other elds. Newman
(2004) shows that the average distances are 4.6 in Biology, 5.9 in Physics and 7.6 in Mathematics.
The main features we will focus on refer to the degree-distribution of nodes which tends to show that
a small part of the population accumulates a large proportion of links, i.e. there is a strong inequality
among agents. In particular, GVM found that the 20% of most-linked authors in Economics account for
about 60% of all the links. Newman (2004) shows that this phenomenon also extends to co-authorship
networks in the elds of Biology, Physics and Mathematics. In each case, the distribution is fat tailed,
with a small fraction of scientists having a very large number of collaborators. Moreover, network
structures are hierarchical. GVM shows that the best-connected researchers collaborate extensively
and most of their coauthors do not collaborate with each other. On the other hand, Newman (2004)
found that most of the connections (64%) of an individual's shortest path to other researchers pass
through the best-connected of their collaborators, and most of the remainders pass through the next-
best connected. GVM illustrates these ndings through the local network of J. Stiglitz represented in
Figure 1.
These results lead GVM to conclude that: "the world of Economics is spanned by inter-linked stars"
(an inter-linked star is a network in which some nodes connected among them accumulate a lot of links
with other nodes who are not connected among themselves). Despite that there is no such conclusion
referred to co-authorship networks in other elds, the similarity in the general results showed in Newman
(2004) suggests a similar pattern in Biology, Physics and Mathematics. Moreover, GVM analyzes the
evolution over the last thirty years and concludes that such a structure is stable over time.
4Stanley Milgram (1967) pioneered the study of path length through a clever experiment where people had to send a
letter to another person who was not directly known to them. In the literature, the diameters of a variety of networks
have been measured. These include purely social networks, co-authorship networks, parts of the internet and parts of the
world wide web. See Albert and Barab asi (2002) for an illuminating account.
3Figure 1: Local network of J. Stiglitz in 1990's
1.2 Preview of the model and results
This paper shows that the eects of some simple driving forces can explain the formation of unequal
and hierarchical scientic collaboration networks as is observed in the real-world. Moreover, we do not
need to assume huge a priori dierences among researchers to reproduce this kind of structures. In
our model, these forces are both the scarcity of original ideas and the benets from cooperation. These
forces stimulate scientic collaboration and they are caused by the heterogeneity among researchers and
by their limited processing and creative capacities. Specically, agents in our model are heterogeneous
in terms of their level of talent (which directly aects the value of their scientic contributions); on
the other hand, their limited processing capacity imposes an upper bound in the number of scientic
contributions they can produce and their limited creative capacity xes an upper bound in the number of
ideas they can create. We propose a simple static model of network formation in which individuals make
decisions concerning the intensity of their collaboration relationships with other researchers through a
link formation game. The decision of whether to form a collaboration link must consider the trade o
between the rewards from collaborating with more productive researchers and the costs derived from
4using part of their limited processing capacity.
After introducing the dening elements of our model, the basic assumptions, the payo function,
and the equilibrium concept in section 2, we characterize the equilibrium networks in section 3. In
particular, the results show that in equilibrium, for any allocation of talents and for a broad family of
production functions, some agents will be able to collaborate with many others and exhaust, is such a
way, their processing capacity. Contrarily, the rest of researchers will have a lack of collaborators and
consequently they will not receive a sucient amount of ideas to exhaust their processing capacity; for
this reason, they will have a much lower scientic productivity. In consequence we show that, regardless
of how small are the a priori dierences among researchers, equilibrium networks can be very unequal
in terms of agents' productivity.
Our model reproduces a natural network formation process that allows us to gure out the conditions
under which self-interested researchers will organize themselves forming the scientic collaboration
networks observed in reality. In consequence, the model provides an incentives-based explanation of the
actual shape of this kind of networks.
1.3 Literature Review
Theoretical models of social network formation can be classied into two groups. On one hand, there
is the physics-based modeling of society. This approach treats agents as if they were just matter. That
is, agents are non-strategic. This set has its origins in the random graph literature and has examples
in sociology and recently in computer science and statistical physics. References of this kind of models
are abundant5 but we will focus on two of them. Jackson and Rogers (2006) proposes a nice, simple
and general model of network formation. The authors combine random meeting and network-based
meeting in a natural manner and analyze the relevance of these two forces in determining the formation
of dierent kinds of networks (scientic collaboration structures are one of them). The second model we
focus on is Arenas et al (2003). The authors present a stylized model of a problem-solving organization
{whose internal communication structure is given by a network{ that can suer congestion. The authors
develop a design problem to determine which kind of network architectures optimizes performance for
any given problem arrival rate. Contrarily to our model, the network is xed and players are non
strategic.
The second classication of models involves strategic formation of networks and use game theoretic
tools. That is, there is no exogenous prescription of how the network is formed but there is a denition
5See Newman (2003) for a survey. Some examples are Watts (1999), Cooper and Frieze (2003) or Price (1976).
5of the rules of the game that agents have to play to form the network (see Jackson (2004) for a survey of
this type of models). The model presented here belongs to this group of models. As introduced above,
the work that more closely relates to our model is chapter 4 in Van der Leij (2006). This author also
attempts to develop a theoretical model to explain the empirical regularities of research collaboration
networks. In both models, heterogeneity across researchers plays a key role in explaining the results.
Contrarily to our paper, Van der Leij constructs a model in which the cost of link formation and the
specic academic rewards scheme aect the equilibrium network topologies. Our model involves the
limited processing capacity and heterogeneity across agents as the key factors for obtaining the results.
Moreover, we do not require a minimum degree of heterogeneity among researchers (as Van der Leij
(2006) does) to reproduce the huge inequalities observed in reality.
2 General setting
Let N be the set of agents, interpreted as researchers, and let n = jNj be a suciently large number.
Each researcher is characterized by her level of talent which is exogenous, xed, and has been randomly
generated from a continuous distribution function6. In consequence, researchers can be ordered by their
level of talent in a well dened ranking. We use natural numbers to label agents according to their
position in that ranking. Thus, agent i has i   1 researchers with a higher talent. Let h be the vector
of talent endowments and hi be the i-th element of this vector interpreted as researcher i's amount
of talent. Notice that hi > hj for any pair of agents such that j > i. The object of the researchers
of this model is to maximize the number and value of their scientic contributions. A researcher can
participate in a new contribution either as creator of the original idea or as processor. Each agent can
play both roles.
 Researchers as creators. All agents have a creative capacity that allows them to generate  original
ideas.
 Researchers as processors. These original ideas need to be processed to become a scientic con-
tribution. This processing work can be done either by the original creator of the idea or by some
collaborator. We assume that all researchers have a limited processing capacity that we normalize
to one.
6The probability of having two agents with the same amount of talent is zero.
6Notice that all researchers of this model are exactly identical with respect to these two faculties, i.e. all
of them have exactly the same creative and processing capacities. Heterogeneity among agents arises
with respect to the value of a particular contribution. We assume that this value depends on the talent
of both the creator and the processor (notice that, for a particular contribution, these two roles can be
played by the same agent). Specically, f(hi;hj) denotes the value of a contribution in which i creates
the original idea and j processes it (or viceversa). We assume a positive relationship between the talents
of both creator and processor and the value of their scientic contribution.
Assumption 1 For any i;j;kN such that i 6= j, f(hi;hj) > f(hi;hk) whenever hj > hk.
In words, for any researcher the higher is the talent of a collaborator the higher is the value of a
shared scientic contribution. Additionally, for k = i this assumption implies that for any researcher
iN the value of a contribution shared with a more talented researcher is higher than the value of a
single-authored contribution7. Another important assumption of the model is related to the size of ,
the creative capacity of agents.
Assumption 2  < 1.
This assumption implies that agents are able to process more ideas than what they are able to
create by their own means. In consequence, researchers need original ideas from others to exhaust their
processing capacity (equal to 1). This scarcity of original ideas pushes the agents of our model to accept
ideas from others. On the other hand, assumption 1 implies that agents have incentives to send their
original ideas to others in order to be processed. These ows of ideas are interpreted here as scientic
collaboration. Therefore, both the scarcity of original ideas and the benets from cooperation stimulate
scientic collaboration in our model.
2.1 Description of the game
The agents' strategic variables refer to the election of collaborators. Specically, each agent i will choose
the n-dimensional vectors qi and pi. The vector qi = (qi1;qi2;:::;qin) refers to the role of agent i as
creator. In particular, qij[0;1] denotes the proportion of i's original ideas sent to j to process. In
consequence,
P
jN qij = 1, 8iN. Thus, qij = 0 means that i will not send any idea to j, therefore i
does not consider j as a potential processor of her ideas. A positive qij implies that i will transmit some
7Notice that we do not impose any restriction on the comparison between the value of a single-authored contribution
by agent i and the value of a contribution in which i collaborates with a less talented researcher.
7original ideas to j. Let Ni = fj 2 N : qji > 0g be the set of players who send original ideas to i and
Mi = fj 2 N : qij > 0g be the set of destinations of i's original ideas. The vector pi = (p1i;p2i;:::;pni)
refers to the role of agent i as processor. In particular, pji[0;1] denotes the processing eort that agent
i invests on each of the ideas coming from agent j. The above mentioned processing capacity constraint
implies that 
P
jN qjipji  1 for all i 2 N. So, pji = 0 means that researcher i invests no time to
process ideas coming from j, therefore i does not consider j as a potential source of original ideas.
Whenever pji > 0 agent i will invest some processing eort to the ideas coming from j.
Agents i and j are collaborators if either pijqij > 0 (i is the creator and j is the processor) or
pjiqji > 0 (j is the creator and i is the processor). In any case, mutual consent is required to establish a
scientic collaboration relationship. Let Q and P be the nn matrices agglomerating the vectors qi and
pi for all iN. Notice that these scientic collaboration relationships can be represented by weighted
and directed links. In particular, there exists a link from i to j if and only if pijqij > 0. Moreover,
pijqij[0;1] can be interpreted as the collaboration intensity in the ow of ideas from agent i (creator)
to agent j (processor). According to this interpretation, the nn matrix G  Q
P is a directed graph
on N, where entry gij denotes the intensity of the scientic collaboration relationship in which i creates
original ideas and j processes them.
Agents play a one-shot game that can be structured in three stages:
Stage 1. Link formation game: all players strategically and simultaneously announce their q and p vectors.
Formally, the strategy space for player i is Si = [0;1]2n. A particular strategy si is a pair (qi;pi).
A strategy prole s = (s1;:::;sn) induces a directed-weighted graph G(s) = Q 
 P. We shall use
the pair (qi;pi) to denote agent i's strategy.
Stage 2. Creation and distribution of ideas: once the scientic collaboration network is formed, each re-
searcher iN creates  ideas and distributes them according to qi.
Stage 3. Processing of ideas and resolution: Each researcher iN process ideas according to pi. Then,
participants in all scientic contributions receive their payo.
As commented above, the object of the researchers of this model is to maximize the number and








The rst part of this function represents the payo derived from the contributions where i acts as
a processor whereas the second part represents the payo obtained from the contributions in which i is
8the creator. These payos are the result of multiplying the value of the particular contribution (which
depends on the collaborators' talents) by the intensity of their collaboration relationship. Payo can
be interpreted as the value of the expected number of contributions.




qjipji  1 (1)
0  qil  1 8 lN and
X
l2N
qil = 1 (2)
0  pji  1 8 jN (3)
The rst restriction represents the limited processing capacity of agents. Restrictions (2) and (3)
derive from the denition of qi and pi, respectively. For a given pair (q i;p i), the objective function
(*) and restrictions (1), (2), and (3) constitute a Linear Programming problem. Given (q
 i;p
 i), a pair
(Q;P) is said to be a Nash Equilibrium if (q
i ;p
i) is the solution of this Linear Programming problem
for all iN. In other words, (Q;P) is a Nash Equilibrium if i(Q;P)  i(qi;q
 i;pi;p
 i) for all
pairs (qi;pi) and for all iN. Given that the creation of a scientic collaboration link requires mutual
consent of the two agents involved and that researchers can announce any p and q vectors they wish
satisfying restrictions (1)-(3) (multidimensional strategy space), a huge coordination problem arises.
As such, the game displays a multiplicity of Nash Equilibria where mutually benecial links can be left
aside8. This is solved if players are allowed to coordinate bilaterally. For this reason, renements on
Nash Equilibrium that allow for coalitional moves are usually applied to this kind of network-formation
games9. The renement we use is the Bilateral Equilibrium that is dened as follows:
Denition 1 A pair (Q;P) is a Bilateral Equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
 (Q;P) constitutes a Nash equilibrium
 For any pair of players i;jN and every pair of strategies (qi;pi) and (qj;pj),
i(qi;qj;q
 i j;pi;pj;p
 i j) > i(Q;P) ) j(qi;qj;q
 i j;pi;pj;p
 i j) < j(Q;P).
8For example, a strategy prole in which pij = qij = 0 8 i 6= j (resulting in the empty network) is always a Nash
Equilibrium.
9Contrarily to Bala and Goyal (2000) and others, our model presents directed links but both agents involved in a link
benet from its existence and mutual consent is required to form it; the direction of the link only refers to the ow of
ideas. So, in spite of having directed links, we do not formulate the network formation as a non cooperative game.
9We shall use the short term BE to refer to this concept. This notion of equilibrium is taken
from Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007); it generalizes the original formulation of pairwise stability due
to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) by allowing pairs of players to modify the intensity of their links
simultaneously.
3 Results
Empirical studies such as Goyal, Van der Leij and Moraga (2006) or Newman (2004) show that scientic
collaboration networks present a highly unequal and hierarchical distribution of links. This implies that
some researchers can be much more active and productive than others and, consequently, they can enjoy
a much better scientic reputation. One may think that big intrinsical dierences among researchers can
constitute the main driving force behind these huge inequalities. Nevertheless, this paper shows that
this is not necessarily the case and highly unequal and hierarchical networks may naturally emerge from
the strategic interaction among very similar (non-identical) researchers. In our equilibrium networks,
some agents will be able to exhaust their processing capacity whereas some others will not process any
idea at all. Propositions (1)-(5) present a list of necessary conditions that strongly narrow the set of
potential BE networks. Throughout this section, we will illustrate the consequences of those conditions
on the set of equilibrium networks. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The next result species the conditions that P must hold for any given Q.












li(0;1) for at most one agent lNi.
For a given Q, agent i's best response p
i should maximize her payo (*) and hold restrictions (1) and
(3), i.e. p
i must be the solution of a Linear Programming problem10. As such, p
i must be one of the
vertices of the polytope dened by restrictions (1) and (3). Conditions (i)-(iii) specify the characteristics
of this vertex.
First, notice that agent i's payo positively depends on pli for any lNi. In consequence, any
researcher should invest as much processing eort as possible (condition (i)). If 
P
lN qli  1 then
10It is easy to see that this solution is unique because hi 6= hj for any pair i;jN.
10restriction (1) will be binding and agent i will exhaust their processing capacity. Otherwise, agent i
will be able to invest the maximum eort to process each of the incoming ideas, i.e. p
li = 1 for all
lNi. Proposition 1 oers two additional features of the optimal response p
i. In order to maximize the
value of their contributions, researchers will preferably process the ideas coming from the most talented
creators (condition (ii)) and they will invest as much eort as possible in processing those ideas; since
hi 6= hj for any pair i;jN, condition (iii) follows. The next corollary summarizes the implications of
Proposition 1. For 
P
lN qli > 1, let tNi be the least talented agent who holds 
P
lN:hl>ht qli  1.




lN qli  1, then p
li = 1 for all lNi such that hl > ht, p




ri = 0 for any other rNi.
 If 
P
lN qli < 1, then p
li = 1 for all lNi.
Given  and Q, notice that Corollary 1 determines the value of p
ji for all iN and for all jNi.
Propositions (2)-(5) constitute a list of necessary conditions for Q. Next we present an immediate
result:
Proposition 2 For any pair of players j;iN, q
ji can be positive only if p
ji > 0.
Agents will not send their original ideas to those researchers who do not invest any eort in processing
them. Since  < 1, these agents can always nd an alternative processor for her ideas with some free
processing capacity and both can protably deviate by increasing the intensity of their collaboration
relationship. Next we show that the best researchers will exhaust their processing capacity:
Proposition 3 Whenever q
jk > 0 for some pair of players j;kN, no player iN such that i 6= j and




In words, in equilibrium no agent jN should send part of their original ideas to some processor
kN when a more talented agent iN does not exhaust their processing capacity. If that is the case,
then i and j will be able to protably deviate by increasing qjipji, i.e. the intensity of the scientic
collaboration in which j and i are the creator and processor, respectively. By doing so, j benets from
the higher talent of i and i increases her expected number of contributions.
As a consequence of this proposition, in equilibrium the original ideas of our scientic community
will accumulate on the most talented researchers. In order to illustrate the implications of Proposition
3, we dene two subsets of N as follows:








Now we are able to write down the following statement:
Corollary 2 For any two agents i;jN such that iH and jL, hi must be higher than hj. The two
most talented agents in L (say k and k+1) can have q
lk > 0 for some l 2 N and q
k;k+1 > 0; q
l;k+1 = 0
for all l 6= k, and q
lm = 0 for any l 2 N and any m 2 L such that m 6= k;k + 1.
Proposition 3 implies that any member of H is more talented that any agent in L. Notice, by
contradiction, that if 
P
l2N q
li < 1 and 
P
l2N q
lj  1 hold for some pair of agents i;j 2 N such that
hi > hj, then there will exist some agent r 2 N such that r 6= j and q
rj > 0. Thus, Proposition 3 would
be violated.
A second implication of Proposition 3 is that almost all members of L will not receive any idea at
all, i.e. q
lm = 0 for almost all m 2 L. Notice that, by Proposition 3, if the second most talented agent
in L (say k+1) has q
l;k+1 > 0 for some l, then l cannot be dierent from the most talented agent in
L (say k). We can follow the same reasoning to conclude that only the two most talented agents in L
can receive original ideas from other researchers.
From this corollary we can conclude that our equilibrium candidates present a clear conguration.
The population can be split into two subgroups: the most talented agents will receive ideas from others
and they will be able to exhaust their processing capacity whereas the rest of researchers will not use
all their capacity. In fact, only two agents in L can receive some idea to process. All the rest12
will not receive any idea at all. Thus, our equilibrium candidates can present huge inequalities among
researchers even though they are very similar; this result holds for any h, even for arbitrarily small
(non-zero) dierences among agents' talents.
Apart from being highly unequal, equilibrium networks present a strong hierarchy as illustrated by
the following result:
Proposition 4 If q
kip
ki > 0 for some pair of agents k;iN, then q
jr cannot be positive for any pair of
agents j;rN such that (i) j 6= i, (ii) hj > hk, and (iii) hr < hi.
11Since  < 1, L is nonempty. Notice also that for any given , Proposition 3 implies that H is nonempty when n is
suciently large.
12This can include a large number of agents if  is low and n is large.
12In other words, whenever there is an active collaboration relationship between agents k and i in
which k is the creator and i is the processor, any agent j (dierent from i) such that hj > hk should
send all their original ideas to agents with a talent higher or equal than hi. Otherwise, agents i and j
can protably deviate by increasing the intensity of their collaboration relationship in which j is the
creator and i is the processor. This result imposes a clear hierarchical structure on our equilibrium
candidates, because it implies that the higher is the talent of a researcher the more talented are her
collaborators. Notice again that this result holds for any arbitrarily small (non-zero) dierences among
agents' talents.
Thus, Propositions 3 and 4 already show that almost identical self-interested researchers will organize
themselves forming hierarchical and unequal structures and we do not need to impose huge a priori
dierences among researchers to reproduce those collaboration structures (this contrasts with the results
of van der Leij (06) in which a minimum degree of heterogeneity among agents is required in order to
reproduce the empirical results about in-degree inequality); in the equilibrium networks of our model
some agents (those in H) will enjoy a relatively large payo because they will be able to exhaust their
processing capacity whereas the rest of agents (those in L) will be much less productive because they
cannot fully exploit their processing capacity. Moreover, the hierarchical structure announced above
raises this inequality among equilibrium payos because the highly talented researchers will collaborate
with each other and this increases the value of their contributions.
From the last two propositions, the next corollary follows:
Corollary 3 (a) No agent i can have q
i;i+k > 0 for any natural number k  2.
(b) If q
ij > 0 and there exists some agent l 2 Nj such that hl < hi, then q
i;j+k cannot be positive for
any natural number k.
In other words, (a) no agent will send part of her original ideas to some researcher located two
positions below her in the ranking of talents and (b) when agent i send original ideas to j and researcher
i is not the least talented agent in Nj then she cannot send original ideas to any agent below j.
With respect to (a), assume by contradiction that q




l;i+1 < 1, then Proposition 3 is violated. Consider now that 
P
l2N q
l;i+1  1. Since  < 1,
the rst i + 1 agents in the ranking of talents can fully process the original ideas generated by i
researchers. In consequence, if 
P
l2N q
l;i+1  1 and qi;i+k > 0 for some k  2 then one of these two
cases must hold: (i) 
P
l2N q
l;j < 1 for some agent j such that j  i or (ii) q
j;i+1 > 0 for some agent j
such that j  i. The rst case violates Proposition 3 and the second case violates Proposition 4. With
13respect to (b), notice that whenever i 6= j this statement is a direct consequence of Proposition 4. The
case in which i = j is explained in the appendix.
In order to oer further details of our equilibrium networks we will distinguish two subcases. First,
let us consider that   i 1
i , where i is a natural number. When   i 1
i , the processing capacity
of i   1 agents allows to process the original ideas created by i researchers (i); specically, the i   1
researchers that precede agent i in the ranking of talents can fully process all original ideas generated
by the rst i researchers in that ranking13. As a consequence of Propositions (1)-(4) agent i will send
all their original ideas to researchers with a higher talent. In such a case we can further detail our
equilibrium candidates as follows:
Proposition 5 Consider that   i 1
i and let j be the most talented agent in Mi. In equilibrium the
following must hold:
(i) q
i;j+k = 0 for any natural number k > 1.
(ii) q








 g, if @l 2 Nj such that hl < hi.
First of all notice that Proposition 2 implies that q
ik > 0 can only hold when p
ik is positive.
Therefore, given that   i 1
i , part (i) of Proposition 5 states that in equilibrium agent i's original
ideas can have, at most, two dierent destinations that must be located at consecutive positions in the
ranking of talents. In other words, any particular node can have at most two out-degree links14. Let j be
the most talented destination of agent i's original ideas. Part (ii) states that whenever i is not the least
talented agent in Nj, this destination must be unique, i.e. q
ij = 1. Part (iii) species the equilibrium
values that q
ij can take when i is the least talented agent in Nj. Since there are two possible equilibrium
values for q
i;j+1 we cannot x a unique equilibrium network candidate. Nevertheless, Propositions (1)-
(5) narrow this set to a great extent.
When  > i 1
i the number of original ideas created by i agents (i) exceeds the processing capacity
of i   1 agents. Specically, the i   1 researchers that precede agent i in the ranking of talents cannot
fully process all original ideas generated by the rst i researchers in that ranking. In consequence,
agent i will have to retain part of their original ideas or send them to agent i + 1 (see Corollary 3).
The optimal decision will depend on the comparison between f(hi;hi) and f(hi;hi+1) which has not
13Notice that this condition cannot hold for i = 1.
14The number of in-degree links is not bounded.
14been xed by Assumption 1. Thus, we need to specify a function f() and a vector h in order to fully
determine the destinations of agent i's original ideas.
In order to illustrate the implications of our results on the equilibrium candidates, we present the
next example.
Example 1 Let us assume that n = 70 and  = 0:1. Since agents' processing capacity is normalized
to one, in this example agents must receive ideas from, at least, 10 dierent origins in order to exhaust
their processing capacity. Propositions (2)-(4) restrict the possible equilibrium vectors q
i for all i 2 N.
Moreover, notice that we can apply Proposition (5) to all agents i 2 N except for i = 1. Thus,
Proposition (2)-(5) almost determine Q. It only remains to x q
1 and the full specication of Q will
follow. The most talented agent in N can either retain their own original ideas or send them to agent
2 depending on the comparison between f(h1;h1) (i.e. the value of a contribution in which 1 creates
and processes an original idea) and f(h1;h2) (i.e. the value of a contribution in which 2 processes an
original idea of agent 1). Let us focus on one of these two possibilities; say that agent 1 prefers to send
their original ideas to 2. Thus, for any vector of talents (h) and for a broad family of f() functions
(assumption 1 is the unique requirement) we can fully specify Q as follows:
q
i = (1;0;0;:::;0) for any agent i 2 [2;11],
q
i = (0;1;0;0;:::;0) for i = 1 and i 2 [12;20],
q
i = (0;0;1;0;:::;0) for any agent i 2 [21;30],
q
i = (0;0;0;1;0;:::;0) for any agent i 2 [31;40],
and so on.



























1 , if i 2 [31;40];
0 , otherwise:
and so on.
15The equilibrium network G = P 
 Q is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Example with n=70 and  = 0:1
Notice the resemblance of this network with the empirical observation represented in Figure 1. The
main contribution of this paper is to show how highly unequal and hierarchical structures can arise from
the strategic interaction among very similar (non-identical) researchers15. As announced by Corollary
2, agents in our equilibrium network self-organize in two groups. In this example agents 1-7 constitute
group H and the rest constitute group L. Those agents in H receive original ideas from others up to
the point in which they can exhaust their processing capacity. Agents 8-70 do not receive any idea from
others and they only send their ideas to one of the rst seven researchers. Moreover, there is a strict
order in the collaboration pattern; agents with a higher talent can send their original ideas to higher
talented processors. As a consequence of these two eects, (i) agents 1-7 will enjoy a higher productivity
than the rest of researchers and (ii) there can be a huge dierence across agents in terms of the value
of their contributions because higher talented agents can work with higher talented collaborators.
15In our scientic collaboration network links are directed in the sense that ideas ow from one collaborator to the
other. This direction is not represented in Figure 2 but is captured by the matrices P and Q described above.
164 Conclusion
In spite of the large body of empirical research about scientic collaboration networks, there is a lack of
foundational theoretical models that analyze how individual decisions contribute to scientic collabora-
tion network formation. This paper proposes a natural network formation game in which heterogeneity
among researchers and limited processing and creative capacities drive the results. The model allows
us to gure out the conditions under which self-interested researchers will organize themselves forming
unequal and hierarchical scientic collaboration networks as is observed in the real-world without the
necessity of imposing huge a priori dierences among researchers.
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19A Proofs








qli;1g for any pi.






This implies that for some jNi, there exists a p0
ji > p
ji holding restrictions (1) and (3). Since agent
i's payo depends positively on pji, this agent can protably deviate by choosing p0
ji instead of p
ji.
Thus, the above inequality cannot hold in equilibrium. (ii) By contradiction let us assume that the
equilibrium vector p
i holding restrictions (1) and (3) holds p
ki > p
ji for some pair of players j;kNi,
































Using the denition of p0
ki we can write:
i = (p0
ji   p
ji)qji[f(hj;hi)   f(hk;hi)] > 0
Therefore p
ki > p
ji cannot hold in equilibrium.
(iii) Assume by contradiction that p
ji;p
ki 2 (0;1) for some pair of agents j;k 2 Ni such that hj > hk.
The deviation considered in case (ii) is also possible and generates a positive marginal payo to the
deviator. In consequence, p
ji and p
ki cannot be between 0 and 1 in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume by contradiction that q
ji > 0 and p
ji = 0. Since  < 1, there exists
some agent k 2 N such that 
P
l2N q
lk < 1. By Proposition 1, p
lk = 1 8l 2 Nk. Agents j and k can
jointly deviate by choosing p0




ji). To satisfy restrictions (1)-(3) after































the above conditions are satised. The deviators' marginal payos are:





jk, we conclude that j and k will jointly deviate and q
ji cannot be positive when p
ji = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider by contradiction an equilibrium in which q




1 for some agent i 6= j such that hi > hk. Notice that, by restriction (2), q
jk > 0 implies that q
ji < 1.
Notice also that, by Proposition 1, pli = 1 for all l 2 Ni. Let us consider that i and j jointly deviate by
choosing p0




jk). In order to assure that restrictions (1)-(3) still hold































satises the above conditions, and so restrictions (1)-(3). The marginal payo for the deviators i and j















ji  1, we can conclude that i > 0. With respect to j, we can use the
denition of q0






ji, hi > hk, and i 6= j we can conclude that j > 0. In consequence, both agents will
agree on that deviation and the situation introduced in the beginning of the proof cannot be hold in
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us assume by contradiction that q
jr > 0 under conditions (i)-(iii) stated
in the proposition. Notice that q
jr > 0 implies that q
ji < 1. Notice also that p
ki > 0. Let us consider
that i and j jointly deviate by choosing p0




















By Proposition 1, q
kip
ki > 0 and hj > hk imply that p
ji = 1 whenever q
ji > 0. Therefore, the second







It is easy to check that p0




















































jr, hi 6= hj, and pjr  1, then j > 0. In consequence, both agents will deviate and the
original situation cannot hold in equilibrium.
Corollary 3 (b). By statement (a) we can conclude that i is the most talented researcher who can
send their original ideas to agent i + 1 in equilibrium. By Proposition 1, p
i;i+1 = 1 for any positive
qi;i+1. In consequence, q
ij > 0 for i = j implies that agent i prefers to retain her own original ideas
rather than sending them to agent i+1. Thus, if q
ii > 0 then q
i;i+k cannot be positive for any natural
number k.
Proof of Proposition 5. First notice that   i 1
i and Propositions (1)-(4) imply that hl > hi for
all l 2 Mi. Let j be the most talented agent in Mi. By Corollary 3 (b), if there exists some l 2 Nj such
that hl < hi then q
ij must be one. Thus, part (ii) of Proposition 5 follows. In consequence, only if i
is the least talented agent in Nj, then q
i;j+k can be positive for some natural number k. Next, we will
proof part (i).
Assume by contradiction that q




l;j+1  1. Since  < 1, agent j + 1 must receive original ideas from at least two dierent
origins. At this point we must consider two possibilities:
(a) 9l 2 Nj+1 such that hl < hi.
In this case, if q
i;j+k > 0 for some k > 1 then Proposition 4 is violated and we reach the desired
contradiction.
(b) hl  hi, for all l 2 Nj+1.
We claim that such a case cannot be sustained in equilibrium when   i 1
i . Since i is the least
talented agent in Nj, Proposition 4 implies that no agent with a talent higher than hi, except for
j, can be included in Nj+1. On the other hand,  < 1 and 
P
l2N q
l;j+1  1 imply that Nj+1
includes at least two dierent agents. In consequence, in this case only agents j and i are included
in Nj+1. This has several implications. First, notice that j must be the least talented agent in
Nj 1. In consequence, j is the best possible destination for the ideas of j + 1. Moreover, since




l;j+1  1 implies that   1
2. In consequence, applying Proposition 1 we can say
that j can only receive original ideas from two dierent origins, which are j + 1 and i. To hold
Proposition 4 these two agents must be consecutive, i.e. j +2 = i. Therefore, a positive q
i;j+k for
k > 1 contradicts that hl > hi for all l 2 Mi. Therefore, case (b) is not sustainable when   i 1
i .
Next, we prove part (iii). Let us assume by contradiction that q








23As showed above in case (b), there must exist some agent l 2 Nj+1 such that hl < hi. In consequence,
Proposition 1 implies that if q
i;j+1 > 0 then p
i;j+1 cannot be dierent from 1. On the other hand, by
Corollary 2 notice that q
i;j+1 > 0 implies that j 2 H, i.e. 
P
l2N q





lj = 1. Since q
ijp



















lj, then Proposition 1 implies that p
ij must be lower than 1. In this
case, i and j can protably deviate by choosing p0
















In consequence, such a q











lj = 1 cannot hold.
Therefore, whenever q






lj must hold and, in consequence,
p
ij = 1. Since q
im = 0 for any m 6= j;j + 1, restriction (2) implies that q
ij + q
i;j+1 = 1. Thus, we can
express the result in terms of q
i;j+1 and say: whenever q
i;j+1 is positive then q
i;j+1 =
P
lNni q
ljp
lj 
1 

must hold.
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